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California’s Determinate Sentencing Law:                
How California Got it Wrong . . . Twice 
Travis Bailey 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”) has 
been found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.  And, 
suppose the Supreme Court found California was violating a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.  But, after receiving instruction on 
how the sentencing procedures could be made constitutional, California 
decides to implement a quick fix—an amendment of the sentencing statute.  
Instead of following the guidance of the Supreme Court, California adopts 
an alternate remedy—not used by any other state—that still violates the 
Constitution.  Unfortunately, this is the current reality in California. 
“[E]limination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of 
sentences can best be achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in 
proportion to the seriousness of the offense as determined by the 
Legislature to be imposed by the court with specified discretion.”1  This 
passage comes from California’s DSL, which was enacted in 1977.  
Determinate sentencing statutes provide statutorily defined terms of 
imprisonment that must be imposed if a defendant is found guilty.  In 
California, for most crimes, the statutes provide lower, middle, and upper 
terms.2  Prior to the enactment of California’s  DSL, most crimes carried an 
indeterminate sentence range, within which judges could choose a sentence 
of any length.3  Since 1977, however, determinate sentencing laws have not 
gone unchallenged.  The Unites States Supreme Court addressed 
 
 J.D. Candidate 2009, Chapman University School of Law.  Thanks to Kris Warren and Mike 
Khalilpour for their support and insight. 
 1 Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, ch. 1139, § 273, 1976 Cal. Stat. (1977) (codified at CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2008)). 
 2 For example, the California Penal Code states: 
Any person who commits an assault upon the person of a peace officer or firefighter with a 
semiautomatic firearm and who knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a 
peace officer or firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the peace 
officer or firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or her duties, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison for five, seven, or nine years. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(d)(2). 
 3 See Nicole Eiland, Sentence Structure: The  Supreme  Court’s  Decision  in  Cunningham Closely 
Follows the Jurisprudence Set Forth in Apprendi and Blakely, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, July–Aug. 
2007, at 31, 36. 
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determinate sentencing laws in Apprendi v. New Jersey,4 Blakely v. 
Washington,5 United States v. Booker,6 and, finally, in Cunningham v. 
California, which declared California’s sentencing procedures 
unconstitutional.7 
Cunningham gave California three ways to amend the DSL: (1) 
employ a jury to find facts used to impose the upper term; (2) give judges 
broad discretion to choose a term from within a statutory range; or (3) find 
another solution consistent with the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.8  The California Supreme Court reacted to Cunningham by 
finding the sentencing law unconstitutional in People v. Sandoval,9 and by 
amending its sentencing laws10 and Rules of Court.11  But these reforms did 
not comply with the recommendations in Cunningham.  California did not 
include a jury in the sentencing process and did not give its judges broad 
discretion to choose a sentence of any length within a set range.  Instead, 
California granted its judges “sound discretion” to choose any of the three 
statutorily specified terms.12  This Note explains why California’s previous 
DSL was unconstitutional, and why, even as amended, California’s  current  
DSL still runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. 
Part I of this Note describes the history of California’s DSL, including 
relevant case law from Almendarez-Torres13 to Cunningham.  This part 
briefly explains People v. Black,14 the California Supreme Court’s pre-
Cunningham attempt to save California’s DSL.  This part then explains  the 
California Legislature’s post-Cunningham amendment of the DSL.  These 
lines of cases are crucial to understanding People v. Sandoval,15 
California’s latest ruling on determinate sentencing. 
Part II of this Note analyzes California’s attempt to make its DSL 
constitutional through legislative amendment,16 amendment of its Rules of 
Court, and the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Sandoval.  This part 
suggests that California’s legislative and judicial branches failed to reform 
California’s DSL in a manner consistent with Cunningham.  California’s 
remedy, while coming close to the Supreme Court’s recommendations and 
 
 4 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 5 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 6 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 7 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). 
 8 Id. at 871. 
 9 People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146 (Cal. 2007). 
 10 Act of March 30, 2007, 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4 (West) (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1170 (West 2008)). 
 11 Cal. Order No. 07-83, 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. R-40–47 (West). 
 12 Act of  March 30, 2007, 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4, 5 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1170 (West 2008)); see infra Parts I, II. 
 13 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 14 People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005). 
 15 People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146 (Cal. 2007). 
 16 Act of March 30, 2007, 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4 (West) (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1170 (West 2008)). 
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what other states employ, still falls short of the constitutional threshold. 
Part III discusses how California can make its DSL constitutional after 
Sandoval.  This part describes the remedies recommended by the Supreme 
Court.17  This part also describes the constitutionally valid method used by 
most states affected by Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker to sentence 
convicted defendants—the use of a jury as the finder of facts needed to 
impose a sentence above the statutory maximum.18 
Finally, Part IV of this Note recommends that California amend its 
DSL to make the upper, middle, and lower sentences advisory.  
California’s actions demonstrate a desire to retain this sentencing triad, 
even though adding a jury to the sentencing process would burden the 
system.19  Still, if California made its guidelines advisory, California’s DSL 
would be constitutional by its 2009 sunset date.  This remedy would be less 
burdensome than grafting a jury onto the sentencing process, and would 
comply with the Sixth Amendment by giving judges broad discretion in 
sentencing. 
I.  DETERMINATE SENTENCING LAW FROM APPRENDI TO 
CUNNINGHAM, INCLUDING THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE’S 
ATTEMPTED PATCH 
A. An Explanation of California’s DSL Prior to the 2007 Amendment 
California’s DSL was enacted in 1977 to eliminate disparity and to 
promote uniformity in sentencing.20  Prior to the 2007 amendment, section 
1170(b) of the California Penal Code provided a different sentencing 
procedure.  Under the previous version of the statute, the court was to 
impose the middle term of imprisonment specified in the statute unless 
there were aggravating or mitigating circumstances.21  If aggravating 
circumstances were found, the higher sentence was justified.22  A judge 
could justify a higher term based on a preponderance of the evidence.23  In 
Cunningham, the Supreme Court found California’s DSL unconstitutional, 
because this determination should be made by a jury under a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard.24 
 
 17 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007). 
 18 Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. 
Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 8 (2005). 
 19 Sandoval, 161 P.3d at 1161. 
 20 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 21 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2004) (amended 2007). 
 22 See id. 
 23 See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 870 (2007). 
 24 See id. 
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B. Almendarez-Torres v. United States: The Beginning of the Supreme 
Court’s Focus on Sentencing Law 
The line of cases leading up to Cunningham and Sandoval began with 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States.25  In 1998, Hugo Almendarez-Torres 
pled guilty to reentry into the United States as a deported alien, a violation 
of 8 U.S.C. section 1326.26  Despite that the offense carried a maximum 
punishment of two years in prison, the sentencing court imposed a term of 
eighty-five months based on Almendarez-Torres’ past commission of an 
aggravated felony that he admitted before entering his plea.27  This longer 
sentence was based upon Section 1326(b)(2), which authorized up to 
twenty years imprisonment for an alien who had previously committed an 
aggravated felony, had subsequently been deported, and then reentered the 
country again illegally.28 
At the sentencing hearing, and again on appeal, Almendarez-Torres 
claimed that the indictment failed to allege the prior conviction.29  Because 
the indictment did not allege the prior conviction, Almendarez-Torres 
claimed that any sentence beyond the ordinary two years for a Section 1326 
violation was constitutionally invalid.30  The district court, Fifth Circuit, 
and the Supreme Court all rejected his argument.31  The Supreme Court 
concluded that Section 1326(b)(2) was a penalty provision that authorized 
the sentencing court to increase the sentence for a repeat offender and did 
not define a separate crime.32  Thus, the Supreme Court stated, “neither the 
statute nor the Constitution requires the Government to charge the factor 
that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the indictment.”33  Therefore, 
prior convictions were considered sentencing factors and not elements of a 
separate crime. 
 
 25 523 U.S. 224 (1998).  For a more detailed explanation of Almendarez-Torres, see Mohammed 
Saif-Alden Wattad, The Meaning of Guilt: Rethinking Apprendi, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 501, 514–15 (2007). 
 26 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.  Under this section, any alien who: 
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United 
States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to 
his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or his application for admission from 
foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's 
reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and 
removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance 
consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not 
more than 2 years, or both. 
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000). 
 27 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227. 
 28 8 U.S.C § 1326(b)(2) (2000). 
 29 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227. 
 30 See id. 
 31 Id. at 227, 247. 
 32 Id. at 226. 
 33 Id. at 226–27. 
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C. Jones v. United States: Facts are Elements of an Offense and Need to 
be Proven to a Jury 
One year later, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. United States.34  
Jones was charged with carjacking under 18 U.S.C. section 2119, which 
carried a maximum sentence of fifteen years.35  He was also charged with 
“using or aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during . . . a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).”36  The indictment made no 
mention of the latter two sections of the statute, which authorize an 
increased sentence if serious bodily injury or death results from the 
carjacking.37  The jury found Jones guilty as charged.38 
The case took a surprising turn when the presentence report 
recommended that Jones be sentenced to twenty five years for the 
carjacking because one of the victims was seriously injured.39  Even though 
the serious bodily injury was not mentioned in the indictment or proven to 
a jury, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
victim had suffered serious bodily injury, and sentenced Jones to twenty-
five years for the subdivision (2) violation.40  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the sentence, and did not read Section 2119(2) as setting out an element of 
an independent offense.41  The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
serious injury subdivision was a separate offense.42  As a separate offense, 
the serious injury must be “charged in the indictment, proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.”43  The Court 
clarified that the factual elements of an offense must be independently 
proved, and not merely used for sentencing consideration.44 
 
 34 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).  See generally Kathleen H. Morkes, Where Are 
We Going, Where Did We Come From: Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Were Invalidated and 
the Consequences for State Sentencing Schemes, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 249, 258–61 (2006). 
 35 Jones, 526 U.S. at 230. 
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that 
has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the 
person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do 
so, shall—(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000). 
 36 Jones, 526 U.S. at 230; 18 U.S.C § 924(c) (1998). 
 37 Jones, 526 U.S. at 230; 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)–(3)  (1998)  (“if serious bodily injury . . . results, be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both . . .” if death results, be fined under 
this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both . . . .”). 
 38 Jones, 526 U.S. at 231. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 231–32. 
 42 Id. at 251–52. 
 43 Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. 
 44 Id. at 232 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); United States v. Gaudin, 515 
U.S. 506 (1995)). 
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D. Apprendi v. New Jersey: The Right of Defendants to Have a Jury Find 
Facts that Will Enhance a Sentence Beyond the Statutory Maximum 
Jones set the stage for Apprendi by categorizing what appeared to be a 
sentencing enhancement as an aggravating fact, and requiring that fact to 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.45  By invalidating New Jersey’s 
sentencing law, Apprendi required juries to find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, any fact that will increase a sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum.46  The defendant in Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of 
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one 
count of the third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.47  
The firearm offense carried a maximum sentence of ten years.48  His 
sentence, however, was enhanced based upon a finding by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he acted “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race,”49 and the trial court imposed a 
twelve year prison term.50  Defendant appealed, arguing “the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias 
upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”51  The Appellate Division of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey affirmed, and a divided New Jersey Supreme Court 
reached the same outcome.52 
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which relied heavily 
on the holdings in Jones v. United States,53 but criticized Almandarez-
Torres v. United States as an “exceptional departure from the historic 
practice[.]”54  The Apprendi court held, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”55  This case marked the beginning of the end 
for the Court’s previous “hands-off approach” to non-capital sentencing 
procedure.56 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see generally Ann Marie Tracey, Has the 
Fat Lady Sung on Sentencing Guidelines?  The Impact of Booker, Blakely, Apprendi, and Foster on 
Ohio’s  Sentencing  Protocol, 34 N. KY. L. REV 71, 78–82 (2007). 
 47 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469–70. 
 48 Id. at 468. 
 49 Id. at 468–69. 
 50 Id. at 471. 
 51 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 52 Id. at 471–72. 
 53 See, e.g., id. at 472–73, 476, 479 n.5, 480 n.7, 483 n.11, 487–88.   Regarding federal law, the 
Jones Court  held,  “under  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  the  notice  and  jury  trial  
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum 
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable  doubt.”    Jones  v.  United  States,  526  U.S.  227,  243  n.6  (1999). 
 54 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487.  See supra Part I.B for a discussion of Almanderez-Torres. 
 55 Id. at 490. 
 56 See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 37, 46–52 (2006)  (discussing  the  Supreme  Court’s  history  regarding  non-capital sentencing prior to 
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E. Blakely v. Washington: The “Statutory Maximum” is Clarified for 
Apprendi Purposes 
Blakely v. Washington clarified Aprendi’s holding by defining the 
term “statutory maximum” as the maximum sentence that a judge could 
impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or what the 
defendant admitted.57  The Blakely defendant pled guilty to kidnapping, and 
was sentenced to ninety months in prison after the trial court determined 
that he acted with deliberate cruelty.58  The statutory maximum for his 
crime was fifty-three months, which the trial judge could enhance only if 
he found facts and conclusions of law that reflected “substantial and 
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”59  But the facts 
contained in the plea were insufficient to support the “exceptional” 
sentence,60 nor were facts supporting this “exceptional” sentence found by 
a jury under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.61  Defendant 
appealed, arguing that the sentencing procedure violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to have a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, “all facts 
legally essential to his sentence.”62  The Supreme Court agreed, and 
“clarified that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, and not the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts.”63 
F. United States v. Booker: The Supreme Court finds the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Unconstitutional and finds that “Advisory” 
Provisions Would not Implicate the Sixth Amendment 
Apprendi made it clear that any fact used to increase a sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum needed to be found by a jury.64  Blakely 
defined the statutory maximum as the maximum term that could be 
imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant.65  Booker, taking this line of reasoning one step further, 
found the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional because they 
established mandatory sentences, without any fact-finding by a jury.66 
 
Apprendi, and the drastic turn towards regulation around the turn of the century). 
 57 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). 
 58 Id. at 298. 
 59 Id. at 299. 
 60 Id. at 303–04. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 301. 
 63 Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Application of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington 
to State Controlled Substance Proceedings, 26 A.L.R. 6TH 511, 511 (2007). 
 64 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 65 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
 66 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005). 
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In two separate cases, defendants were convicted of charges relating 
to the distribution of cocaine.67  The first defendant’s sentence was 
increased by more than eight years based on the trial judge’s—and not the 
jury’s—finding that the defendant possessed additional quantities of 
drugs.68  In the second case, the judge found facts that would have added 
ten years to the defendant’s sentence, but the judge declined to apply the 
enhancements.69 
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are 
incompatible with the Sixth Amendment because the Guidelines are 
“mandatory and impose binding requirements on all sentencing judges.”70  
“Merely advisory provisions, recommending but not requiring the selection 
of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, all Members of 
the Court agreed, would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”71  The 
Supreme Court went on to say that, “when a trial judge exercises his 
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the 
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge 
deems relevant.”72 
G. People v. Black I: The California Supreme Court’s First Attempt to 
Avoid the United States Supreme Court’s Holdings and Find the 
California DSL Constitutional 
Black was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a minor, and two 
counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child.73  He was found guilty, 
and the judge imposed a sixteen year sentence—the upper term under the 
sentencing guidelines.74  The trial court listed several aggravating factors as 
reasons for imposing the upper term.75  Defendant appealed, arguing that 
under the Sixth Amendment, he has a right to have a jury find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the existence of aggravating factors used to justify the 
imposition of the upper term.76 
The California Supreme Court, in a 6-1 decision, ruled that 
California’s DSL was constitutional and outside of the Apprendi rule.77  
 
 67 Id. at 220.  For more analysis, see generally M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for 
Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533 (2005). 
 68 Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
 69 Id. at 228–29. 
 70 Id. at 233. 
 71 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. 223) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 72 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
 73 People  v.  Black,  113  P.3d  534,  536  (Cal.  2004)  (hereinafter  “Black I”). 
 74 Id. at 536–37. 
 75 Id. at 551. The court gave the   following   reasons   for   imposing   the   upper   term:   “Defendant 
forced his stepdaughter to have intercourse with him on numerous occasions, defendant's stepdaughter 
was particularly vulnerable, defendant abused a position of trust and confidence, and defendant inflicted 
emotional  and  physical  injury  on  his  stepdaughter.”  Id. 
 76 Id. 
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The court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court’s prior decisions 
“[did] not draw a bright line.”78  Ultimately, the California Supreme Court 
found that the “defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial was not 
violated by the trial court’s imposition of the upper term sentence for his 
conviction of continuous sexual abuse or by its imposition of consecutive 
sentences on all three counts.”79  This was California’s first attempt to save 
its DSL post-Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.  Despite California’s DSL 
being a clear example of what the Justices in Apprendi, Blakely, and 
Booker found unconstitutional, California disregarded the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in an attempt to preserve the 1977 sentencing law. 
H. Cunningham v. California: The Supreme Court Finds California’s 
DSL Unconstitutional 
The California Supreme Court found that California’s DSL was 
constitutional in Black, but the United States Supreme Court disagreed 
when it decided Cunningham.  The Supreme Court invalidated California’s 
DSL because judges, not juries, had the power to find facts and enhance 
sentences based upon facts that were not admitted by the defendant or 
found within the jury’s verdict.80  Cunningham was tried and convicted of 
continuous sexual abuse of a minor under the age of fourteen.81 
Under the California Determinate Sentencing Law, the offense was punishable 
by one of three precise terms of imprisonment: a low-term sentence of 6 years, a 
middle-term sentence of 12 years, or an upper-term sentence of 16 years.  The 
judge could impose either the lower-, middle-, or upper-term sentence based on 
his findings on various aggravating and mitigating factors.82 
“The trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence six 
aggravating circumstances, among them, the particular vulnerability of 
Cunningham’s victim, and Cunningham’s violent conduct, which indicated 
a serious danger to the community.”83  “In mitigation, the judge found one 
fact: Cunningham had no record or prior criminal conduct.  Concluding that 
the aggravators outweighed the sole mitigator, the judge sentenced 
Cunningham to the upper term of 16 years.”84  Cunningham appealed, 
arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial had been violated 
because the facts that elevated his sentence were found by a judge using the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, instead of a jury of his peers 
 
 77 See Jonathan D. Soglin et al., Blakely, Booker, & Black: Beyond the Bright Line, 18 FED. 
SENT’G. REP. 46 (2006) for a closer look at People v. Black, and an explanation of how Black departs 
from the Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker line of cases. 
 78 Black, 113 P.3d at 547. 
 79 Id. at 550. 
 80 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 870 (2007). 
 81 Id. at 860.  The minor was his ten-year-old son.  See 2005 Cal. LEXIS 7128. 
 82 Eiland, supra note 3, at 31. 
 83 Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860. 
 84 Id. at 860–61. 
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employing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.85 
The Supreme Court stated California’s DSL does not resemble the 
advisory system that the Booker court had in mind.86  Instead, under 
California’s system, “judges are not free to exercise their discretion to 
select a specific sentence within a defined range.”87  The judge in 
Cunningham did not have an option to choose a sentence between six and 
sixteen years.  He was required to impose a sentence of “12 years, nothing 
less and nothing more, unless he found facts allowing the imposition of a 
sentence of 6 or 16 years.”88  The Supreme Court made its view crystal 
clear when it reiterated that, “[f]actfinding to elevate a sentence from 12 to 
16 years, our decisions make plain, falls within the province of the jury 
employing a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, not the bailiwick of a 
judge determining where the preponderance of the evidence lies.”89 
According to the Supreme Court, either the judge needs to be given 
broad discretion to choose a sentence within a set range, or a jury needs to 
be used as the finder of any fact that could enhance a defendant’s sentence.  
California’s DSL “allocate[d] to judges sole authority to find facts 
permitting the imposition of an upper term sentence,”90 and thus the system 
violated the Sixth Amendment.  The Court concluded by stating that “[t]he 
ball . . . lies in [California’s] court” as to how to fix its DSL.91 
I. California’s Legislature Reacts Quickly in Response to the Supreme 
Courts Holding in Cunningham 
Cunningham was decided on January 22, 2007.92  Within a week, the 
California Legislature was already analyzing the rules laid down in 
Cunningham and attempting to remedy the defect found by the Supreme 
Court.93  The California Senate held an urgent meeting on January 30, 2007 
to discuss Cunningham, and how the sentencing law could be made 
constitutional.94  In an attempt to address the Cunningham ruling, the 
Legislature decided that the key issue was whether it should amend the 
Penal Code to provide that if a crime is punishable by a lower, middle, or 
upper term of imprisonment, the “choice of appropriate term would rest 
 
 85 Id. at 860. 
 86 Id. at 870.  In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
unconstitutional because they were mandatory, and not merely advisory.  See supra Part I.F.  
California’s  DSL,  like  the  Federal  Sentencing  Guidelines, creates a mandatory procedure. 
 87 Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 870 (internal quotations omitted). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 871 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2004)). 
 92 Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 856. 
 93 2007 Cal Legis. Serv. page no. 4 (West). 
 94 Id.  In the comments of Senate Bill 40, the Senate explained, "[i]t is the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting this provision to respond to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Cunningham  v.  California.”  Id. 
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within the sound discretion of the court.”95 
The California Senate answered the question in the affirmative and 
amended Penal Code section 1170 to give judges the discretion to impose 
the lower, middle, or upper term authorized by statute.96  The Bill further 
stated that the legislative intent was to address the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cunningham, and to “maintain stability in California’s criminal 
justice system while the criminal justice and sentencing structures in 
California sentencing are being reviewed.”97  The Legislation was set to 
become effective March 30, 2007, and was scheduled to sunset in 2009.98 
II.  CALIFORNIA’S POST-CUNNINGHAM ATTEMPTS TO REPAIR 
THE DETERMINATE SENTENCING LAW 
A. The Legislative Amendment Does Not Meet the Requirements of the 
Supreme Court and the Constitution 
As mentioned above, the sole reason for Senate Bill 40 was to remedy 
the defect found in California’s DSL by the United States Supreme Court.99  
The changes made, however, still failed to adequately address the problem.  
According to Cunningham, judges needed to be given broad discretion to 
choose a sentence from a specified range, or juries needed to be used to 
find facts that justify the imposition of upper term sentences.100  The 
Legislature, however, chose to implement a different solution.101 
The California Legislature gave judges discretion to choose one of the 
sentences from the already established sentencing triad, not discretion to 
choose a sentence somewhere between a determined range.102  The 
amended law allowed judges to impose the lower, middle, or upper term at 
their discretion.103  This limited discretion was not what the Supreme Court 
had in mind when it used the term, “broad discretion” in Booker.104  Nor 
was the statute amended to include any fact-finding role for the jury in 
relation to sentencing, as required by Cunningham.105 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 5.  Prior to the amendment, the statute read, “the   court   shall   order   imposition   of   the  
middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation   of   the   crime.”  People v. 
Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146, 1152 (Cal. 2007). 
 97 2007 Cal Legis. Serv. page no. 4 (West). 
 98 Id. at 4, 6.  This means that, if no further legislative action is taken, the provisions of the bill 
will be repealed on January 1, 2009. 
 99 Id. at 4. 
 100 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007). 
 101 2007 Cal Legis. Serv. page no. 5 (West).  The Senate   decided   that   “when a judgment of 
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the . . . choice of the 
appropriate  term  shall  rest  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court.”    Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a 
judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence  within  a  statutory  range.”). 
 105 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 2007). 
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B. Judicial: Both the Rules of Court and the California Supreme Court’s 
Holding in Sandoval Fail to Render the DSL Constitutional 
1. The California Judicial Council Amends the Rules of Court in 
Response to the Legislatures Amendment of Penal Code Section 
1170 
On May 18, 2007, the California Judicial Council amended the 
California Rules of Court, to become effective on May 23, 2007.106  The 
Judicial Council changed the definition of circumstances in aggravation 
from “facts that justify the imposition of the upper prison term” to “factors 
that the court may consider in its broad discretion in imposing of the three 
authorized prison terms referred to in Section 1170(b).”107  The Judicial 
Council also changed the meaning of circumstances in mitigation to 
resemble that of circumstances in aggravation—that is, simply factors to be 
considered by the court.108  The Judicial Council made it mandatory for a 
judge to give reasons for whichever sentence he chooses, whether it be the 
lower, middle, or upper term.109 
The Judicial Council amended the Rules of Court so that they 
complied with the Senate’s amendments of Section 1170(b).  The Judicial 
Council reiterated that judges are given broad discretion to choose between 
one of the three statutorily defined sentences, and no longer need to find an 
aggravating fact in order to impose the upper term; the judge simply needs 
to give his reasons for imposing any sentence.110 
2. The California Supreme Court Grants Review of People v. 
Sandoval and Upholds the Amendments made by the California 
Legislature 
After Cunningham, Senate Bill 40, and the amendments by the 
Judicial Council, the stage was set for the California Supreme Court to rule 
on a case involving DSL issues.  It did not take long.  The California 
Supreme Court granted review in People v. Sandoval to “determine 
whether [the] defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as defined in 
Cunningham v. California were violated by the imposition of an upper term 
sentence and, if so, the remedy to which she is entitled.”111  In July 2007, 
the California Supreme Court issued the opinion for Sandoval, which 
attempted to reconcile California’s DSL—as amended by Senate Bill 40—
with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 
 
 106 Cal. Jud. Council, List of Amendments to the California Rules of Court: Adopted on May 18, 
2007, effective May 23, 2007, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/amendments/may2007.pdf (last visited 
June 25, 2008). 
 107 Id. at 1. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 2. 
 110 Id. at 3. 
 111 People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Cal. 2007) (citations omitted). 
BAILEY 12/22/2008 1:17 PM 
2008] California’s  Determinate  Sentencing  Law 99 
The defendant was charged with the premeditated murders of two men 
and with the attempted premeditated murder of a third man.112  She was 
convicted and sentenced to fourteen years, including an eleven-year upper 
term for the premeditated murder of the first man.113  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the imposition of the upper term violated her federal 
constitutional right to a jury trial.114  The court of appeal made a minor 
change to the sentence for attempted premeditated murder and affirmed the 
judgment, rejecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim.115 
The California Supreme Court stated that the aggravating 
circumstances found were based upon the evidence presented at trial, but 
not directly at issue in the trial.116  Therefore, the court said, the defendant 
did not have the incentive or opportunity to challenge the evidence 
supporting these aggravating circumstances during the trial.117  After 
reviewing the evidence and all of the aggravating circumstances found by 
the trial court, the California Supreme Court found that the imposition of 
the upper term violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, the error 
was not harmless, and that the imposition of the upper term on the first 
count needed to be reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with 
Cunningham.118  The court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that, if instructed on the aggravating circumstances, the jury would have 
reached the same conclusion that the trial court reached.119 
The Attorney General urged the court to amend the statute to give 
judges broad discretion to choose between the three sentences.120 
Incidentally, while the case was pending, the California Legislature 
amended the statute through SB40 as recommended by the Attorney 
General.121  Therefore, the court found that the only issue remaining was 
“what type of resentencing proceedings must be conducted in those cases,” 
in which a Sixth Amendment error is found, requiring a reversal and 
remand in order to cure the defect.122 
 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.  The trial court gave the following aggravating factors as reasons for imposing the upper 
term: 
[C]rime involving a great amount of violence . . . incredibly callous behavior.  [Defendant] 
had no concern about the consequences of her action.  The victims were particularly 
vulnerable . . . . [and] were inebriated.  Clearly, [Defendant] was the motivating force 
behind these actions.  Her actions showed planning and premeditation. 
Id. at 1153–54. 
 114 Id. at 1150. 
 115 Id.  The Court of Appeal modified the sentence for attempted premeditated murder from 
eighteen months down to one year. 
 116 Id. at 1155. 
 117 Sandoval, 161 P.3d at 1155. 
 118 Id. at 1150. 
 119 Id. at 1156. 
 120 Id. at 1158. 
 121 Id. at 1159. 
 122 Id. 
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The court instructed the lower courts to conduct sentencing in a 
manner consistent with the amendments to the DSL, as modified by the 
legislature.123  Trial judges now have to give reasons, not facts, for 
imposing any of the three statutorily defined sentences.124  Previously, the 
middle term required no justification, because the middle term was 
presumed unless mitigating or aggravating circumstances were found.125  
Regarding the use of juries to find aggravating circumstances, the court 
claimed that “engrafting a jury trial onto the sentencing process established 
in the former DSL would significantly complicate and distort the 
sentencing scheme.”126 
The court justified the judicial reformation of the sentencing rules, and 
decided that applying retroactive changes would not violate the ex post 
facto clause because the changes did not alter “substantial personal rights,” 
but simply changed the “mode of procedure.”127  “In summary, the felony 
sentencing process continues much as it existed before except that selection 
of the appropriate prison term is now entirely discretionary and the middle 
term is no longer the presumptive term.”128  Aggravating factors need not 
be found by a jury or trial court, facts need not be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and factors need not be mentioned in the pleadings.129  
Judges do, however, need to give reasons for imposing a particular term, 
including the middle term.130 
This is the second time that the California Supreme Court has gotten it 
wrong.  The same court found in Black that California’s DSL was not 
unconstitutional, despite that it obviously was.131  Cunningham was 
decided shortly after Black, and found the law unconstitutional.132  The 
California Supreme Court has been wrong on this subject before, and they 
got it wrong again by backing the California Legislature and Senate Bill 40. 
 
 123 Id. at 1160. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 1160–61. 
 126 Id. at 1161.  The  court  also  mentioned  that  neither  the  DSL  or  the  Judicial  Council’s  sentencing  
rules   “were   drafted   in   contemplation   of   a   jury   trial   on   aggravating   circumstances.”    Id.  Further, it 
would be difficult for prosecutors to select which aggravators should be tried to a jury, because no 
absolute list of aggravating circumstances exists.  Prosecutors would also be exercising discretion that 
was meant for the judge. 
 127 Id. at 1165. 
 128 J. Richard Couzens & Tricia Ann Bigelow, Lifting the Fog of Cunningham: Black II, 
Sandoval, and Senate Bill 40, at 30, CAL. CTS. REV. (Summer 2007). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Black, 113 P.3d  534, 550 (Cal. 2005). 
 132 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). 
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III.  POTENTIAL REMEDIES: EMPLOY A JURY IN THE SENTENCING 
PROCESS, LEGITIMATELY GIVE JUDGES BROAD DISCRETION, OR 
RETURN TO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING 
This legislative and judicial reformation of the sentencing procedures 
in California falls short of passing constitutional muster.  The Supreme 
Court emphasized—through Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and then, again, in 
Cunningham—that in order to make California’s DSL constitutional, judges 
need to be given “broad discretion”133 to choose a sentence from within a 
specified range, or aggravating facts need to be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.134  It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court intended a 
mandatory sentencing triad to fall under the rubric of “broad discretion.”  
In fact, the term, “broad discretion” is used in conjunction with the word 
“range,”135 and not with a set of statutorily determined mandatory 
sentences. 
Sandoval essentially leaves defendants in their previous position.  The 
upper term may still be imposed without a jury finding any facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the sentence options are still limited to the three 
statutorily defined terms.  In fact, judges are not required to find any facts, 
and only need to give reasons for imposing whichever sentence they 
choose. 136  Judges have been given more discretionary power, but it is still 
limited, which is neither acceptable nor comparable to “broad discretion.”  
The initial home-run for defendants in Cunningham turned out to be a bunt 
when the California Supreme Court handed down Sandoval.  The positive 
news is the amendment to Section 1170 will sunset in 2009, which means 
there will be a chance to amend the law for the better. 
The Supreme Court left it up to California as to what the state wanted 
to do in order to render its DSL constitutional.137  The Supreme Court gave 
three options:  Follow the lead of other states that employ a jury in the 
sentencing process, permit judges to “genuinely . . . exercise broad 
discretion within a statutory range,” or “otherwise alter its system, so long 
as the State observes Sixth Amendment limitations declared” by the 
Supreme Court.138  The Court listed specific states that modified their 
 
 133 Id. at 871. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Apprendi   v.   New   Jersey,   530   U.S.   466,   481   (2000)   (“As in Williams, our periodic 
recognition of judges’ broad discretion in sentencing—since the 19th-century shift in this country from 
statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing judges discretion within a permissible 
range . . . .”);;  Blakely  v.  Washington,   542  U.S.  296,  342   (2004)   (Bryer,   J.,   dissenting)   (“The modern 
history of preguidelines sentencing likewise indicates that judges had broad discretion to set sentences 
within   a   statutory   range  based  on  uncharged  conduct.”);;  United  States  v.  Booker,   543  U.S.   220,  233  
(2005)   (“We  have  never  doubted   the   authority  of   a   judge   to   exercise  broad discretion in imposing a 
sentence  within  a  statutory  range.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 136 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2008). 
 137 Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871. 
 138 Id. 
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sentencing laws as examples of the first two options.139  California chose 
the last option, which gave no guidance.  California clearly has not been 
capable of rendering its own DSL constitutional on several occasions. 
A.  The Use of Juries to Find Facts for Sentencing Purposes 
The Supreme Court’s first recommended option—keeping the triad 
system while installing a jury component into the sentencing procedure—is 
partially in use by California.140  Full use of this option can be easily 
achieved because, as the Supreme Court pointed out, California already 
employs a jury to determine statutory sentencing enhancements.141  Further, 
seven out of the nine states confronted with this problem have decided that 
requiring the aggravating facts to be proven to a jury is a good solution.142 
Kansas was the first state to invalidate and reform its own sentencing 
procedures based on Apprendi.143  After the Kansas Supreme Court found 
its sentencing law unconstitutional, the Kansas Legislature amended the 
invalidated law to include a jury in the process.144  Kansas now requires 
any factor that could increase a defendant’s sentence to be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury of no less than six jurors.145  By 
altering their sentencing procedure this way, Kansas was able to keep using 
the same statutorily defined sentences and bring its sentencing procedure 
within the bounds of the Constitution. 
 
 139 Id. at 871, nn.17–18 (listing Alaska, Arizona, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and 
Washington as states that have retained determinate sentencing, but which have amended their statutes 
to incorporate the use of a jury within the sentencing procedures, and listing Indiana and Tennessee as 
states that have amended their sentencing procedures to permit judges to genuinely exercise broad 
discretion in choosing a sentence). 
 140 Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871. 
 141 Id.; see also CAL. PENAL  CODE § 1170.1(e) (West 2008) (using juries to find facts needed to 
enhance sentences); People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 545 (Cal. 2005) (noting that, unlike aggravating 
circumstances, statutory enhancements must be charged in the indictment, and the underlying facts must 
be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt) (internal citations omitted). 
 142 Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871, n.17. 
 143 State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001).  The district court made findings as to certain 
aggravating factors that increased  Gould’s  sentence  beyond  the  statutory  maximum.    The  district  court,  
rather than the jury, made these findings as required by K.S.A. 21-4716(a).  Apprendi requires that such 
findings be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because Kansas law authorizing upward 
departure sentences directly contravenes this requirement, the law is unconstitutional.  See also Michael 
M.  O’Hear,  The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 835, 869 (2006) (noting that Kansas was the first state to modify its sentencing procedure to 
include jury fact-finding). 
 144 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b) (2007).  Under Kansas law, the district attorney must move 
to seek an upward durational departure sentence.  The court then determines if the evidence supporting 
the alleged fact or factors that may increase the penalty for a crime shall be presented to a jury during 
the trial or after determination of innocence or guilt.  If it is in the interest of justice, the court shall hold 
a separate departure sentence proceeding before the trial jury, as soon as practicable.  If a trial juror is 
unavailable, an alternate can be used, but at no time can the sentencing proceeding be conducted before 
less than six jurors.  In order for the upper term to be given, the jury must find unanimously beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the fact or factor exists. 
 145 Id.; see also Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 18, at 8. 
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The California Supreme court expressed the opinion that engrafting a 
jury onto the sentencing procedure would burden the system and 
complicate the proceedings.146  The court further stated that many of the 
aggravating circumstances were drafted to guide judges’ discretion, not 
“for the purpose of requiring factual findings by a jury.”147  But, inevitably, 
“[s]ome facts are more conducive to jury fact-finding than others.”148  
Clearly, the use of a jury during sentencing is feasible, as seven other states 
already employ a jury to find facts used for the sentencing of defendants.149 
In his Blakely dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the use of a jury for 
sentencing would raise the time and financial costs of trial.150  This may be 
a valid point, but sentencing hearings always have to take place, and the 
information has to be presented to a judge.  Jury deliberations may take 
longer than a judge’s deliberation, but a simple form—much like a special 
verdict form—could be drafted by the attorneys and be given to the jurors 
to expedite the process.  Further, rendering the law constitutional may be 
well worth the slight increase in judicial resources. 
B. Give Judges Broad Discretion by Amending the DSL to Follow 
Tennessee and Indiana in Making the Three Specified Terms 
“Advisory” 
A second option is to keep the sentencing triad in place, but designate 
the statutorily defined sentences “advisory.”  In Booker, the Supreme Court 
decided that advisory guidelines would not violate the constitution.151  This 
would mean judges would not have to use the suggested terms, but instead 
would have the freedom to impose a sentence anywhere between the upper 
and lower term.  Several states, including Tennessee and Indiana, have 
gone this route to keep their statutorily defined sentences on the books. 
In the wake of Booker, the Tennessee Legislature amended the state 
sentencing guidelines, making the predetermined statutorily defined 
sentences advisory.152  The statute now reads, “[i]n imposing a specific 
sentence within the range of punishment, the court shall consider, but is not 
bound by, the following advisory sentencing guidelines.”153  Prior to the 
amendment, the statute had not included the word “advisory,” and instead 
called for the imposition of specific terms based upon specific scenarios.154 
 
 146 People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146, 1161 (Cal. 2007). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Darmer, supra note 67, at 571. 
 149 Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 n.17 (2007). 
 150 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 340 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 151 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).  See supra part II.F for discussion of 
Booker. 
 152 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210 (2006). 
 153 Id. 
 154  
(c) The presumptive sentence for a Class B, C, D and E felony shall be the minimum 
sentence in the range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors. The presumptive 
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Indiana also employs an advisory system.155  According to the Indiana 
statute, an “advisory sentence means a guideline sentence that the court 
may voluntarily consider as the midpoint between the maximum sentence 
and the minimum sentence.”156  Essentially, there is a range set by the 
minimum and maximum sentence, because the middle term is advisory.  
The judge is not required to use the advisory sentence, except in certain 
circumstances.157  In all other circumstances where the statute gives a 
minimum, an advisory, and a maximum sentence, the sentencing judge can 
choose any sentence length between the minimum and maximum term.158 
If the California Legislature changes the mandatory sentences to 
advisory, judges would have broad discretion to choose a sentence between 
the lower and upper term, bringing California’s DSL within the 
requirements of the Constitution.  Essentially, California would fall in line 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Booker,159 and join Indiana and 
Tennessee as states that preserved their determinate sentencing laws by 
switching to advisory sentences. 
C. Do Away with Sentencing Triad Completely and Return to 
Indeterminate Sentencing 
The third option is to amend the sentencing law to do away with the 
sentencing triad all together.  Judges would be given the authority to use 
broad discretion in imposing a sentence of any length within a statutory 
range.  This is how sentencing was done in California prior to 1977.  
Although this relatively simple remedy would cure the constitutional 
defect, California is not likely to choose this option. 
 
sentence for a Class A felony shall be the midpoint of the range if there are no 
enhancement or mitigating factors. 
(d) Should there be enhancement but no mitigating factors for a Class B, C, D or E felony, 
then the court may set the sentence above the minimum in that range but still within the 
range. Should there be enhancement but no mitigating factors for a Class A felony, then the 
court shall set the sentence at or above the midpoint of the range. Should there be 
mitigating but no enhancement factors for a Class A felony, then the court shall set the 
sentence at or below the midpoint of the range. 
(e) Should there be enhancement and mitigating factors for a Class B, C, D or E felony, the 
court must start at the minimum sentence in the range, enhance the sentence within the 
range as appropriate for the enhancement factors, then reduce the sentence within the range 
as appropriate for the mitigating factors. Should there be enhancement and mitigating 
factors for a Class A felony, the court must start at the midpoint of the range, enhance the 
sentence within the range as appropriate for the enhancement factors, and then reduce the 
sentence within the range as appropriate for the mitigating factors. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210 (2001). 
 155 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-1.3(a) (2007). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id.  Under the Indiana law, the sentencing judge is only required to use the advisory sentence 
when imposing consecutive sentences in accordance with Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, when 
imposing an additional fixed term to an habitual offender, or when imposing an additional fixed term to 
a repeat sexual offender. 
 158 Id. 
 159 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
California’s DSL is still unconstitutional.  Judges are no longer 
required to find facts by a preponderance of the evidence.  Instead, judges 
simply need to give reasons for imposing whichever term they choose.  The 
California Legislature and California Supreme Court call this, “broad 
discretion.”  Unfortunately, California’s current scheme would not fall 
under the United States Supreme Court’s understanding of “broad 
discretion.”  California judges are still required to impose one of three 
terms, and are not free to impose a sentence anywhere between the lower 
and upper term.  I recommend that California alter its system so as to make 
the defined sentences advisory.  By doing this, California could keep its 
determinate sentencing mostly intact, avoiding the burden of grafting a jury 
onto the sentencing process while bringing the determinate sentencing law 
within the bounds of the Sixth Amendment.  Until an acceptable change is 
made, California will continue to sentence defendants in a way that violates 
their constitutional rights. 
